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Abstract 
This thesis is a result of an initial interest in multiculturalism – how states to deal with 
cultural plurality and the role of the concept of culture in this process – which led to a 
particular interest in the use of “culture” as a defence plea in courts; what is referred to as a 
“cultural defence”. With reference to two empirical cases it explores the legal, political and 
anthropological discussion on the cultural defence and how the concept of culture has been 
presented in the trials. The argument of the author is that there needs to be a focus on the very 
concept of culture itself before it can be decided if and how we should accommodate culture 
in court. In particular it is argued that an essentialist notion of culture cannot be at the base of 
a cultural defence as a cultural defence needs to adjust to the changing nature of culture and 
acknowledge the issues related to culture and authority. This argument is in part driven by 
alternative notions of culture and cultural representation such as those provided by Wikan, 
Barth, Ardener and Baumann.  
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1. Introduction 
The premise on which much academic and political discussion today takes form is that the 
world is currently in a phase of differentiation, pluralism, mobility, “mixing and meeting” 
(what is by many scholars referred to as part of the “globalisation process”) and that the 
democratic nation-states, mainly those in the West, are facing new challenges as a 
consequence of this process. The challenges arise, it is argued, as a consequence of flows of 
people moving across vast areas of the world, permanently or temporarily, but more than 
often keeping close ties with their country of origin or primary affiliation (Ballard et al. 
2009b, p. 9).  The challenges are often phrased as concerning integration and segregation, 
rights and duties, minority and majority, and concepts such as multiculturalism, 
transnationalism, hybridity and identity politics have been developed as tools to describe and 
sometimes even ideologically manage the current world order. Given a key role in the 
discussions pertaining to all the aforementioned phenomena is the concept of culture. Culture 
has become a central concept on the political and academic scene, or, in more illustrative 
terms, “culture is on the loose” (Wikan 2002, p. 79). To my mind this serves as an appropriate 
description of culture’s position in today’s discursive climate – pointing to how elusive yet 
disputed and powerful the concept is.  
  This thesis will investigate what happens when the concept of culture enters the court 
room as a defence insofar as it provides a justification for lessening the guilt or culpability of 
the defendant. It is not my aim in this thesis to take a stance for or against the cultural 
defence. I am interested in how the discussion regarding a cultural defence is framed and what 
notions of culture underlie, or even complicate, the discussion. Further, I am concerned with 
the issue of representation; who is given precedence over others to define and represent 
culture in court? In the analysis I will provide arguments and insights from anthropological 
debates on the concept of culture as well as the general debate concerning the cultural defence 
and I will present two empirical case studies that will be analysed and discussed in relation to 
the aforementioned debates.  
Research question: What are some of the main issues surrounding the use of a cultural 
defence and is it at all possible for the concept of culture be a valid basis for a defence plea in 
a court of law? 
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1.1 Method and Material  
This thesis is a literature study and therefore only secondary sources have been used. The 
discussion concerning a cultural defence belongs at once at a general level of discussion and 
analysis, as the world is indeed interconnected; states take after each other in law and 
governance, ideologies spread and cultural diversity is increasingly debated in most nation-
states. However, it simultaneously belongs at a particular level of discussion and analysis, as 
all nation-states are, at least formally, sovereign and therefore control and sanction their 
citizens independently. This necessarily implies that there are a wide range of approaches one 
can take to this issue. Some approaches focus on a particular country and its history of 
multiculturalism and how culture is presented in court (such as Truffin and Arjona 2009). 
Other studies compare two countries that are in either similar or dissimilar situations (Kusters 
2009) or present a legal-philosophical treatment of the issue (such as Woodman 2009b). My 
approach is closer to the general level of discussion and analysis, meaning that I am firstly 
and foremost interested in how culture can function as a legitimate defence in the legal 
systems of modern nation-states. The reason that I chose this level of analysis is because I 
found, as will be elaborated on later on in the paper, that the cultural defence is not only 
highly disputed but also a fairly new topic of discussion. This compelled me to take first 
things first; why is the cultural defence being discussed world-wide now? What is meant by 
“culture” in this context and how does it present itself in a court of law? What are the main 
issues that are discussed in relation to the cultural defence? Despite my empirical examples 
being particularly situated within the borders of each their own nation-state they are discussed 
and analysed not mainly in relation to each state’s political and legal characteristics, but to 
provide a further understanding of the general issues that will be presented.  
 Just like fieldwork requires the author to provide a background of the field or a study 
based on qualitative interviews requires the author to present the interview subject, it is 
necessary for a literature study to provide a presentation of the literature that actually make up 
the underpinning for the arguments and analysis one produces. As far as understanding what 
the cultural defence is all about and what the arguments surrounding it are, I found extensive 
use of two anthologies in particular; Multicultural Jurisprudence: Comparative Perspectives 
on the Cultural Defense, edited by Foblets and Renteln (2009) and Legal Practice and 
Cultural Diversity, edited by Grillo et al. (2009). These both consist of studies from law, 
political science and anthropology and therefore provide a range of perspectives on the 
cultural defence. It is largely with help from these that I have been able to categorise the main 
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issues concerning the cultural defence. For a deeper understanding of the arguments for and 
against the cultural defence I made use of two books by different anthropologists that are 
dedicated to empirically demonstrating two vastly different stances towards the cultural 
defence; Unni Wikan’s Generous Betrayal (2002) and Alison Dundes Renteln’s The Cultural 
Defense (2004). The former seeks to demonstrate what is at stake for the weakest members of 
social groups, in particular women and children, if members of that social group should be 
allowed to invoke culture as a defence against criminal actions, and the latter provides a vast 
amount of cases to demonstrate how cultural misunderstandings in court can sometimes have 
tragic effects for the defendant and how a cultural defence would be a protective measure for 
groups who are already in a minority position. 
 For many of my arguments it was necessary to discuss the concept of culture as such 
and choosing which aspects of the culture-debate to bring into this thesis was difficult due to 
the complexity of the topic and the limitations of this thesis. I found that the majority of the 
literature on the cultural defence based their arguments on an essentialist understanding of 
culture. This led me to look to anthropologists whose understanding of culture goes explicitly 
against this conception of culture and I found that Barth, Wikan and Baumann criticises the 
essentialist conception of culture from different vantage points that together provide an wide-
ranging critique of the approach. It is important, then, not to conflate the discussion on culture 
that is raised in this paper with a discussion of the concept of culture per se.  
  
1.2 Limitations 
My greatest obstacle while writing this paper has been my limited knowledge of law. Diving 
into the world of jurisprudence and court cases has been intriguing but time consuming and 
there is no doubt that this paper could have been written more efficiently and with more 
intricate arguments had I possessed any knowledge of law beforehand. This insight has if 
anything made me more convinced of the great scholarly value of using interdisciplinary 
approaches to studies such as mine.  
 As already mentioned I will not be taking a definite stance for or against the cultural 
defence and this has to do with the limitations of this thesis. This type of defence can cover a 
wide range of different cases – from hard criminal cases to land and language disputes – and 
may affect people in very different positions – from first to third generation immigrants to 
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indigenous people and other long-time minorities. Unfortunately, for this paper it means that I 
will not be able to do justice to all the levels at which the cultural defence can operate. 
Aspects of the cultural defence that deserves more attention are, for example, whether one 
should differentiate between long-term minorities and immigrants in relation to the cultural 
defence and the extent to which minorities are discriminated against under the system of law 
that we have operating today.   
The last limitation relates directly to the general level approach that I chose for my 
study (see chapter 1.1) and concerns the empirical data. Given my general approach to the 
cultural defence, choosing only two case studies creates the risk of being labelled reductionist 
or determinist – to look into only two cases, no matter with how much depth, will necessarily 
limit my argument. There is the risk of too much speculation or creating hypothetical “if not, 
then…”-arguments. I was faced with an abundance of cases in my literature, so lack of data 
was not why I after much deliberation chose to go with primarily only two cases. To present a 
wide range of cases would have compromised the depth of my arguments, seeing as only 
limited information on each case would room in this paper. It would also be difficult for the 
reader to assess my arguments if they were based on cases that were only presented in part.  
 
2. A Background for the Discussion of a Cultural Defence 
In this chapter I seek to explain what scholars mean when they talk about a “cultural defence” 
through tracing the various definitions that I have encountered and emphasising the central 
aspects of these. I also try to contextualise the concept within the modern nation-state in order 
to understand why this concept has become a relevant point of discussion in recent years. 
Lastly, I will dedicate a subchapter to the concept of culture and some of the contesting views 
of its relevance, content, dynamics, location and function. I believe that in order to understand 
the ambivalence that exists among scholars towards the concept of a cultural defence we need 
to take a closer look at the concept of culture.  
 
2.1 Defining the Concept 
Defining the concepts through which we understand and organise life in a bureaucratically 
advanced information society such as our own is of paramount importance if we are to 
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develop anything to anywhere, but at the same time this seems to be one of the more difficult 
and halting tasks that scholars, politicians and policy makers get stuck on. In order to evaluate 
something one should ideally understand what it means, but who gets to decide the scope of, 
or the limits of, a concept? An incipient concept like the “cultural defence” is only at the 
beginning phase, or at the scholastic bargaining phase, of being mapped out as a functional 
concept.
1
 Not even Multicultural Jurisprudence, a book that has the cultural defence as its 
main focus, provides a definition of it (Renteln and Foblets 2009, p. 1). The only definition 
that I have encountered that covers both when the cultural defence should be used and how it 
may be used is Woodman, who says that: “a culture defence is a rule of state law which 
constitutes a complete or partial defence to a crime or mitigation which reduces the 
punishment, and which takes effect where the defendant would not have committed the 
criminal act had they not belonged to a particular culture“ (Woodman 2009b, p. 13). Other 
scholars’ definitions, if they provide them at all, seem to be focusing greatly on when a 
cultural defence should be considered, but rarely on how the cultural defence should be 
applied (could it be grounds for acquittal, mediating circumstances etc.?). For instance, 
Renteln states that a cultural defence should be considered when “[…] an individual’s 
behaviour is influenced to such a large extent by his culture that either (1) the individual 
simply did not believe that his actions contravened any laws, or (2) the individual felt 
compelled to act the way he did. In both cases the individual’s culpability is lessened.” 
(Renteln 2004, p. 187)  
 I cannot provide a unison definition of the concept, as there seems to be none, but I 
can briefly outline the general idea that scholars seem to rest their arguments on: that 
defendants should be able to refer to certain aspects of their cultural background as motivating 
factors behind the circumstances that they are on trial for and that judges should be required 
to consider such information (see for instance Renteln 2004, p. 5). I have stressed “required” 
in the previous sentence because it is important to keep in mind that there are several cases 
from almost all over the world (Renteln & Foblets 2009, p. 1; Ballard et al 2009a, p. 2; 
Truffin & Arjona 2009, p. 91-92) where culture has been considered as relevant to the verdict, 
but that there is no state law (see Woodman’s definition above) that requires the court to 
                                                        
1
 Gordon Woodman (Woodman 2009, p. 7) actually insists that calling the defence for a 
“cultural” defence is grammatically erroneous on the ground that is should denote that the 
defence in itself is a part of the culture, not merely culturally motivated, and calls for a name 
change to “culture defence” (a feat which he pursues in his own texts at least and that is 
neither here nor there in this paper, but illustrative when demonstrating the indecision 
concerning the concept) 
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consider culture. In practice, then, there are cases that have considered culture as part of a 
defence, but they are rarely found from a search on “cultural defence” (Renteln 2004, p. 7; 
Truffin & Arjona 2009, p. 92) because it is not a by law established legal plea (Woodman 
2009a, p. 144, Maier 2009, p. 240). This means that it is difficult to create statistics or clear 
overviews over when the cultural defence is used and how it is used. In fact, Woodman and 
Renteln have detected that, in English law and US law respectively, evidence that can be 
considered to be “cultural” in character is often dismissed as irrelevant (Woodman 2009b, p. 
32; Renteln 2004, p. 5). One of the worries that follows from this current system is that it is in 
fact no system at all; there is no standardised method to deal with cultural evidence in court 
and this can have discriminatory effects. In chapter three I will deal more thoroughly with the 
discussions that surround the cultural defence and identify the key issues.  
 
2.2 Contextualising the Debate 
Now it is time to ask why the discussion about a cultural defence is even brought to the fore – 
why is it considered relevant and why now? In most introductory passages of articles and 
books on the cultural defence it is made clear that the author(s) assume that we are living in a 
multicultural, transnational world where the nation-states are entering an increasingly 
culturally heterogeneous reality and that this is why the issue of the cultural defence is 
relevant now. The crux is, in the words of Ballard et al., “how far should societies and 
especially legal systems and legal actors go to accommodate the plurality which is an 
inescapable characteristic of contemporary societies?” (Ballard et al., 2009b, p. 11).  
 The plurality that Ballard describes in the above passage is commonly referred to as 
“multiculturalism”. I find, along with other scholars, that a distinction between descriptive 
and ideological multiculturalism is helpful. The former denotes the cohabitation of many 
different ethnic and cultural groups in one geographical space which constitutes a society (or 
today, a state) (Wikan 2004, p. 194) and can also be described with terms like 
“multiethnicity” (Ekholm Friedman 2004, p. 227). The latter, ideological multiculturalism, 
refers to the belief that plurality is good for society and that state policies should promote and 
maintain the diversity (ibid., p. 228). Contrary to what for example nationalist discourses 
proclaim there is nothing new about multicultural societies in the descriptive sense (Wikan 
2002, p. 32). For instance, Roth breaks down the illusion that there ever existed a 
homogenous Sweden into which immigrants came and “created” a multicultural society (Roth 
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2004, p. 214). Instead, he argues, Swedish societal structure has been multicultural for a very 
long time, but served under different ideologies (ibid., p. 217).  
So if multiculturalism, in the sense of a culturally diverse society, is not new, merely 
an old structure operating under new ideologies, why has multicultural jurisprudence and the 
cultural defence not been self-evident components of states’ juridical structures from the 
beginning? I do not claim to have a single answer to this question but believe that we can gain 
some understanding through the concept of “methodological nationalism”. Wimmer and 
Glick Schiller argue that the concept of the nation-state with its concomitant nationalism has 
significantly shaped the way we understand and handle transnational migration (Wimmer and 
Glick Schiller 2002, p. 301). What they call methodological nationalism is “the assumption 
that the [nation-state] is the natural social and political form of the modern world” (ibid., p. 
302). With the naturalisation of the nation-state there also emerged a notion of peoplehood 
that fitted this territorial, social, political and economic unit: people as a sovereign entity, 
people as citizens of a state holding equal rights before the law, people as a group of 
obligatory solidarity and people as an ethnic community (ibid., p. 307). This assumption 
creates the illusion that transnational communities and multiculturalism are new phenomena 
that have arisen in otherwise stable, homogenous social structures (i.e. nation-states) (ibid., p. 
302). Anthropologists played a role in this development. When doing anthropology “at home” 
they tended to focus on groups that they considered “culturally different” due to a different 
origin and history from the majority. What they did not consider, however, was that this 
differentialisation came more from what Wimmer and Glick Schiller calls the “politicisation 
of nation-building” than from the minorities’ de facto different historical origins (ibid., p. 
305-306). 
 In this context migrants have received special attention because they obscure the 
“naturalness” of the relationship between the nation, citizenship and the people – they call 
into question the absolute loyalty one people supposedly has to one state, one system of law 
and one polity (ibid., p. 309). The system of law is intrinsically tied to this nation-state and 
has also been treated under the principles of methodological nationalism; we assume that our 
principles of law were established in order to serve a culturally homogenous population 
equally. Today multiculturalism, transnationalism and hybridity are receiving increasing 
attention, and even ideological support, and it is becoming clearer that the homogenous 
population that was assumed during the establishment of our legal system is based on an 
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empirically incorrect notion, a myth, of “one nation, one people”. The cultural defence and 
multicultural jurisprudence have emerged as topics of discussion in this discursive climate.  
 
2.3 The Concept of Culture 
It seems to me that it is in anthropologists’ position as “culture experts” (Wikan 2002, p. 79) 
that we can contribute the most to the discussion on a cultural defence. With a history of 
using, debating and redefining the term as long as the discipline itself, and having tons of 
empirical material which probes into the daily, experienced and constructed mechanisms of 
culture, whether they be contested positions or organized patterning, anthropology is well-
equipped to raise their voices in the discussion on the cultural defence. If there is a fairly 
stable consensus around the fact that cultural identity, no matter how constructed and 
internally contested, is playing an increasingly central role in politics, there seems to be no 
such consensus on what this abstract concept of culture is, who it belongs to, how it is 
constructed or what meaning it has, and it would probably not be more than a tiny hyperbole 
to say that within anthropology there are as many opinions on “culture” as there are 
anthropologists.  
 Renteln, who argues persistently for a cultural defence, provides a definition of culture 
which maintains that individuals unconsciously internalise cultural categories from birth and 
that these come to manage how individuals act and think (Renteln 2009b, p. 62). In stating 
this she strongly underplays the hybrid, contested and power-related aspects of culture that 
have been central to the debate on culture since postmodernism made its mark. This is a 
conscious standpoint from Renteln’s side and she states elsewhere that “culture is not as 
malleable as postmodern critics maintain” (Renteln 2004, p. 11). Others, such as Woodman 
and Ballard et al., also use definitions of culture which emphasise cohesion and internalisation 
before conflict and agency (Woodman 2009b, p. 8; Ballard et al. 2009b, p. 15), but they are 
more sensitive to how the other aspects of culture problematise the debate on a cultural 
defence, e.g. the risk of stereotyping and undue generalisations or that cultural meaning is 
dependent on positioning (Woodman 2009b, p. 13).   
 The above provide essentialist models of understanding culture if we follow 
Baumann’s characterization; cultures are treated as “finished objects” that are passed down 
from one generation to the next in the form of tradition (Baumann 1999, p. 24-25). This 
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understanding of culture, which then is the foundation for many of the arguments around the 
cultural defence, has been widely criticised, not least from Baumann himself who sees it as 
ignoring human capacity for agency and restricting each person to having only one culture 
(ibid. p. 84). Wikan is also among those who criticise the essentialist approach to culture and 
fears that culture will become a new concept of race; “the other” will be constructed as a 
product of their culture and all their choices reduced to cultural standards (often lower ones) 
that are imposed on them and against which they are incapable of resisting, being “deprived 
of motivation and intention” (Wikan 2002, p. 81). She calls for a stronger focus on each 
person’s agency and argues that we have let a deep fallacy enter the debate when we start 
talking about the agency of culture, as in “culture clashes”; culture cannot act, it is an abstract 
concept, only humans have the capacity for agency and consequently, only humans can 
“clash” with one other (ibid., p. 83). 
 Another assumption behind the essentialist approach to culture is that of culture as 
cohesive and organised. To illustrate how this assumption can be criticised I will make use of 
Barth’s article “The Analysis of Culture in Complex Societies”. He argues that our 
understanding of culture is ineffective insofar as we see a society containing people, look for 
patterns in organisation and daily life and where we find it, collect this information, put it into 
a coherent scheme and call it “culture” (Barth 1989, p. 122, 132). According to Barth, 
empirical reality reveals that each person’s life is structured around different, and sometimes 
several, loci of authority and that no aspect of “culture” ever pertains to every individual that 
is associated with that culture (ibid., p. 130). Despite this critique, Barth does not advocate 
anarchy or argue that society is a disorganised mess. The solution is to see society as partially 
organised and contested and shift our analytical unit from “cohesive culture” to social 
processes, or streams, that display some degree of coherence over time but that exist with, and 
sometimes in contestation with, each other, overlapping in institutions and individuals (ibid., 
pp.130-133).  
 So we see that there are critiques against the sort of essentialist definition of culture 
that the cultural defence is mostly based on. However, it would be a mistake on my behalf to 
portray the essentialist conception of culture in solely inimical terms. Despite the constructed 
nature of culture as we know it and the versatile empirical reality that the culture concept 
tends to overshadow, it is equally an empirical reality that people do define not only others 
but also themselves according to an essentialist notion of culture. Baumann, who as 
mentioned is critical towards the essentialist approach to culture, still argues that we cannot 
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disregard this notion as false and be done with it – simply because people use this discourse to 
negotiate their own position in relation to others or in relation to institutions (Baumann 1997, 
pp. 212-213). Baumann thus distinguishes between two types of discourse on culture; one 
demotic, which sees culture as processual and negotiable (ibid., p. 215), and one dominant, 
which reifies culture and corresponds to the essentialist understanding described above (ibid., 
p. 209). It will be argued later on in the paper that the former discourse could hugely benefit 
our understanding, and subsequent management, of a cultural defence. First, however, we will 
take a closer look at the existing discussion concerning the cultural defence. 
 
3. The Discussion Surrounding the Cultural Defence 
In this chapter I explore how scholars have approached the possibility of raising a cultural 
defence. I identify a number of main issues around which the discussions often revolve. I 
have divided the chapter into subchapters which I hope cover the scope of the discussion that 
surrounds the cultural defence. The point here is for the reader to gain some insight into the 
debate concerning the cultural defence before I present the cases. The cases will later be 
discussed and analysed partly with reference to the discussions presented in this chapter.  
 
3.1 Right to Culture versus Other Human Rights 
The International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights is signed by most nations and 
according to article 27 of this covenant, people have a “right to culture”; “In those states in 
which ethnic, religious, or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities 
shall not be denied the right, in community with the other members of their group, to enjoy 
their own culture, to profess and practice their own religion, or to use their own language” 
(quoted in Renteln 2004, p. 213). Renteln argues that this right in itself should entitle people 
to a cultural defence because states are obliged to protect the right to culture (Renteln 2009b, 
p. 63).Yet, there are some practices that are claimed to be “cultural”, for instance all forms of 
honour violence, that are also in direct violation of other human rights. According to Maier, 
honour killings in Germany have in the past often been reduced from “murder” to 
“manslaughter” due to the invocation of a cultural defence (Maier 2009, p. 241). Germany, 
like most other countries, does not have a cultural defence category in their criminal law so 
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when critique came of the mild sentences that honour crimes received it was possible for the 
courts to simply restrict or reject the cultural defence (ibid., p. 242). Had a cultural defence 
category existed in German criminal law then the jury would have had to consider it, and it 
could be argued that it would be more difficult for the jury to uphold the human rights of 
Muslim women due to the “cultural rights” of their closest kin2 (ibid., p. 246).  
Woodman suggests the exact opposite of Renteln: that accepting the cultural defence 
as a distinct general exemption defence could in fact be incompatible with human rights 
agreements, because a cultural defence could potentially make it easier to get away with 
violations of other human rights (Woodman 2009b, p. 33). The counterargument here is that 
cultural rights should be protected as long as they do not interfere with other human rights 
(Renteln 2009b, p. 78). Put in other words this should mean that cultural traditions that collide 
with human rights should not be entitled to protection. There seems, to my mind, that there 
are too many fuzzy and grey areas around this type of statement for it to be a valid point of 
reference in a discussion on a cultural defence. For instance, one can hardly say that cultural 
traditions are good or bad because they are not statically replicated, but are interpreted and 
motivated differently by each individual actor who subscribes to them and this malleability 
should seem particularly clear when a tradition is “transported” from one context to another 
(such as across continents). Further, the discussion around the cultural defence revolves 
around its usage in state courts, not human rights courts, and people are mainly sentenced 
according to that state’s national laws, not human rights violations, so it seems that one would 
be applying that wrong measuring tool if one concentrates one’s discussion on the cultural 
defence solely on its validity in relation to human rights. 
 
3.2 Delineating the Extent of a Cultural Defence 
This issue was touched upon already in chapter two when addressing the problem of defining 
the cultural defence. Most minds probably immediately think of criminal law when the 
concept of  a cultural defence is brought to mind; could one be partially or wholly excused for 
beating one’s child or spouse, force one’s spouse to sexual intercourse, commit murder etc. in 
the name of culture? These scenarios are certainly not irrelevant to the discussion of a cultural 
                                                        
2 I disagree with Maier in denoting “Muslims” in particular in this context. We know that the 
same type of honour violence exists among Christian groups from the MENA-region as well, 
and that honour killings are not an Islamic invention (see Wikan 2002, p. 100). 
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defence and there is all need to consider these cases when considering cultural defence as a 
whole, but a cultural defence could also be a possibility in cases concerning child welfare, 
asylum jurisprudence, housing codes (Renteln & Foblets 2009, p. 2) or even damage awards 
(Renteln 2009a, p. 199). According to Renteln & Foblets there is a distorted focus on “the 
gory cases” in both mainstream media and in academia (Renteln & Foblets 2009, p. 3).  
 Woodman and Amirthalingam, who both restrict their discussion of the cultural 
defence to the realm of criminal law, are sceptical to the acceptance of a distinct cultural 
defence (Woodman 2009b, p. 33; Amirthalingam 2009, p. 37) at all for reasons that will be 
discussed further in this chapter (practically difficult to judge what is cultural, the dynamic 
character of culture, the risk of stereotyping and enhancing the “us and them”-dichotomy 
etc.). Amirthalingam would rather see that the existing defences in criminal law be modified 
so as to be more “culturally inclusive” (Amirthalingam 2009, p. 37). Woodman suggests that 
a cultural defence should not be invoked in order to prevent conviction, but should be a 
possibility to use as a mitigating factor in sentencing (Woodman 2009b, p. 20).  
 
3.3 Accommodating Equality before the Law and Cultural 
Variety 
Equality before the law is a fundamental legal principle in Western democratic nation-states. 
It implies such things as the same set of laws applying to all, the right for everyone to a fair 
trial etc. What is becoming more and more clear is that this principle is not as self-evident as 
it may sound (Ballard et al. 2009b, p. 12). Both arguments for and against the cultural defence 
can cite the principle of “equality before the law” as an argument for their case. For the 
problem is one of how we treat people equally in a court of law who are discriminated against 
outside the courtroom because they are perceived as unequal, or different. Roughly put, and 
of course there will be middle-path arguments but to illustrate the scope of the debate, we can 
on the one side identify what Ballard et al. call the “when in Rome”-argument, meaning that 
all citizens, irrespective of background, have the same rights and obligations in relation to the 
law and that through the law the state should seek to uphold a level of “conformity with 
existing values and practices” (ibid., p. 11). This argument is usually held amongst people 
who are sceptical to an ideologically multicultural society (ibid.) and subsequently their 
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stance in relation to a cultural defence is one of scepticism. Unni Wikan, whose case study 
will be dealt with extensively further on in the thesis, takes a position close to this.  
On the other side we find the argument that in order to treat people equally, we need to 
take into consideration and value their differences, i.e. legally accommodate diversity (ibid., 
p. 13). Here it is argued that our idea of having “one set of laws for all” is already a fallacy 
when we decide to accommodate differences among people such as mental capacity or state 
and it is pointed out that courts do take into consideration people’s backgrounds, there is just 
no systematised way of dealing with it (ibid., p. 13). Renteln constructs an argument 
congruent with this position; to take cultural background into account is as important in 
achieving equality before the law as is considering other things, such as mental health 
(Renteln 2009b, p. 62).   
 
3.4 The Objective Reasonable Person 
One of the most debated legal instruments used to determine culpability is the objective 
reasonable person test (Renteln 2004, p. 15) or the ordinary citizen test (Amirthalingam 2009, 
p. 37).  Here, defendants’ actions are judged according to how an ordinary citizen could 
reasonably be expected to act in that particular situation (Woodman 2009b, p. 23). Through 
the test (or the standard), the defendant’s culpability is decided by comparison with “an 
ordinary person sharing the characteristics of the defendant”, but formally only characteristics 
such as age, sex, pregnancy, mental illness or physical disability are considered (ibid.). It is 
noteworthy that culture is omitted from this equation and that the reasonable person test relies 
on a an archetype that is extracted from the majority.  The implication of this is that not all 
citizens get the same support from this plea and that it might in many cases be discriminatory 
against minorities (Amirthalingam 2009, p. 37).  
 This test is controversial, but still stands in many countries and it seems to be difficult 
to develop an alternative strategy. Renteln, not surprisingly, argues that in order to circumvent 
the problems arising from the reasonable person test there should be a separate defence 
available to those who do not belong to the majority culture – namely the cultural defence 
(Renteln 2009b, p.66). If one follows Amirthalingam’s argument then the cultural defence 
would not solve the real problem with the reasonable person test – namely that there is too 
much focus on who the “person” in the equation is (what sex, age etc.) as opposed for focus 
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on the “reasonable”-element, and consequently there is too much bickering around a fictional 
archetype rather than the actual responsibility of the defendant (Amirthalingam 2009, p. 48-
49). Instead of comparing the defendant to an archetype and letting the defendant’s level of 
correspondence with said archetype determine his culpability, Amirthalingam suggests that 
the defendant be evaluated individually, considering such things as personal background 
(ibid., p. 49). In this scenario there is no advocacy for a separate cultural defence, but rather 
that a call for the restructuring of other types of defence to incorporate a more individualised 
and culturally sensitive approach.  
 
3.5 Cultural Defence for Whom? Who is “Cultural” Enough? 
Most people tend to think of the cultural defence as being a measure available to minority 
cultures, and when looking at the entirety of the literature that I have encountered on the topic 
there seems to be little doubt that this is how most academics also see the cultural defence, or 
at least how they treat it empirically. There seems to be disagreement, however, as to whether 
the cultural defence will function as a safeguard or as a discriminatory measure for minorities. 
One can argue that a state’s legal system is designed by values intrinsic to the culture of the 
majority
3
 and that it is unfair that minorities should be subject to the same value hierarchy 
(Kusters 2009, p 199). The cultural defence then becomes a means to ensure the right to be 
equal before the law (see Ch. 3.3). Yet, one could also argue that the minorities are at risk of 
being perceived as cultural before they are human, leaving them in a discriminated position 
compared to the majority population, who are human before cultural beings and thus freer in 
their actions (Amirthalingam 2009, p. 36). In Amirthalingam’s terms, minorities are 
consequently reduced to an “inferior standard” (ibid.) and there is a risk of greater alienation 
between majority and minority (ibid., p. 43). This resonates with the discussion above about 
the risk of culture becoming a new term for race.  
 There is also the question of how long one is an immigrant; do second or even third 
generation immigrants share their parents’ or grandparents’ culture (see for instance Wikan 
2002, p. 72)? If so, can we assume anything about how or to what extent? How would a 
cultural defence accommodate the changing of traditions and values over time in minority 
societies? The legal system at large is constantly changing to adjust to new values and needs 
                                                        
3 Majority is here used not necessarily to denote quantity, but rather to denote that group of 
people whose values have the greatest claim to hegemony in a given state 
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in society; would the cultural defence merely cement the minority in a time and a place and 
stall possibilities for the development and modernisation that the “cultureless” majority have 
gone through? Or, alternatively, would it privilege the minorities, making their voices heard 
and defend cultural traditions against unwanted assimilation? 
 The last issue under this heading is one that receives too little attention in this paper 
and concerns minorities who have resided in the country for a long time, such as indigenous 
people; should one differentiate between recent immigrants and the more long-term minorities 
in questions of rights and culture (such as the question of a cultural defence)? Kymlicka 
differentiates between these two groups and argues that immigrants have fewer rights to have 
their culture accommodated in the new society because they have chosen to uproot 
themselves and by that relinquished some of their right to live as they did in the homeland 
(Kymlicka 1995, p. 95-96). Renteln makes a convincing counterargument to Kymlicka’s, to 
my mind at least, when she states that a liberal democracy, if it is true to its liberal ideology, 
should regard birth place as arbitrary and thus consider the right to culture as equal to all 
members of society regardless of their birthplace (Renteln 2004, p. 214). Furthermore, if 
cultural rights are a human right then they should apply equally to immigrants and other 
minorities, seeing as human rights are available to everyone (ibid.). This is not an argument 
for or against cultural defence, but an argument as to who may exert a claim to such a defence 
should it become available.  
 
3.6 The Problem of Authority 
This issue was alluded to in the subchapter 2.3 and Wikan frames it succinctly: within each 
community (or culture) there are different views on cultural practices, but “not all persons 
will have an equal chance to gain credence for their views” (Wikan 2002, p. 84). So whose 
views are being held as normative at the expense of other people’s views? The scholars who 
present this argument often focus on women and children as the losers in this situation, having 
the least say in the formation of cultural norms and values (Amirthalingam 2009, p. 43; 
Wikan 2002, p. 156). The problem of culture and authority has a long history in anthropology 
and has been debated along both inter- and intra-cultural lines, i.e. both who has the authority 
to define a culture within a culture (i.e. the use of key informants) and between cultures (such 
as ethnographic authority; the translation of cultural meaning from one cultural context to 
another). Ardener (2006 [1975]) was one of the earlier anthropological scholars to discuss this 
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dynamic – he argued that anthropological knowledge about culture and societies was 
collected from talking to men and observing women, meaning that cultures are written down 
and defined in the words of men. To Ardener this problem is in part technical in that men to a 
larger degree occupy a public position that is more available (and perceived as more 
interesting) to anthropologists and that men tend to be trained to speak in a language more 
suited for academia (Ardener 2006 [1975], p. 48). The problems that are identified in 
Ardener’s paper, and other contributions to discussion of anthropology, culture and authority, 
are valid in the court room as well. Whose culture is being defended in a cultural defence and 
at whose expense? Who gets to represent culture in court? These questions bring us to the last 
subchapter; the issues surrounding how the cultural defence may be carried out in practice. 
 
3.7 Practical Implementation 
As has been demonstrated, there exists neither a clear definition of culture nor a 
straightforward understanding of the transmission of culture and this makes the 
implementation of a cultural defence a particularly tricky matter as one has to make decisions 
as to who belongs to a culture, whether a cultural praxis is as prevalent as claimed by the 
defendant and to what extent culture should reduce culpability. When discussing how a 
cultural defence should be presented and judged in court most people abide to an essentialist 
understanding of culture, or use what Baumann calls the dominant discourse on culture 
(Baumann 1997). 
 Even if we did decide on a clear definition of culture there would still be a crucial 
problem to solve; namely that of how to standardize the treatment of “culture” in court. 
Judges, juries, even lawyers and witnesses such as social workers should ideally be competent 
to evaluate a cultural argument when presented with one. It has been suggested that “culture”-
knowledge should be incorporated into the curriculum at law school, so that future lawyers 
and judges are taught to evaluate cultural evidence and show cultural sensitivity where needed 
(Renteln 2009b, p. 81). This suggestion would be a measure both for standardizing the 
procedure and making sure that culture actually is given attention in a court of law. It also, 
however, requires that a solid definition of culture exists and can be justified, which 
complicates matters as we have seen that there is no such definition of culture. 
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The expert witness is the most commonly suggested additional constituent of a trial 
involving a cultural defence (see for instance Woodman 2009b, p. 32). Expert witnesses in 
cases involving a cultural defence would be persons with particular knowledge about the 
culture in question. Anthropologists are candidates here, but even leaders of communities or 
“elders” or someone from within the culture who is believed to have in-depth knowledge 
about the culture he or she belongs to are candidates. Renteln points out that it could be 
insulting to a cultural community to have an outsider expert (usually a white middle-class 
person with academic background) be granted authority to explain their culture (Renteln 
2009b, p. 81). Yet, “native” expert witnesses are controversial for a number of reasons, as 
these people may have a stake in the outcome or be closely linked to the defendant. There is 
also the problem of having one person, no matter how high position this person occupies 
within his or her culture, represent an entire culture. Caughey argues that anthropologists 
generally might be better equipped to provide information that could be relevant to a case 
where the cultural defence is invoked (Caughey 2009, p. 326). Their academic background 
has trained them in collecting, interpreting and presenting knowledge about cultures in a 
manner that has scientific validity and holds authority in a courtroom (ibid.). Caughey also 
argues that anthropologists, despite the controversial aspects of using culture as an argument 
in court, have a responsibility to say yes to appearing in court if he or she sees that culture has 
played a role in the offense in order to make sure that cultural evidence is not being abused 
(ibid., p. 324). Caughey stands out in the debate on the cultural defence because he in 
practical terms manages to steer away from essentialism when arguing for the importance of 
incorporating cultural sensitivity in trials. His method is as follows: seeing as most criminal 
cases will concern an individual human being and his or her actions rather than a custom in 
and for itself (like the general banning of hijab for instance), it is not enough to merely state 
the existence and prevalence of a custom or tradition, one needs to consider this particular 
person’s circumstances; to “locate an individual within his or her cultural background” (ibid., 
p. 327). This requires research about the particular person the case concerns and the aim is to 
steer away from simplistic cultural reductions where people are constructed as unambiguous 
representatives of their cultures and rather base cultural evidence provided in court on 
“approaches such as those in life-history and person-centred ethnography” (ibid., p. 334).  
 
In this chapter I have looked at the main issues around which the cultural defences is debated 
for or against. There are practical concerns relating to how to present culture in court, what 
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qualifies as “cultural evidence” and the need for a competent jury to evaluate the cultural 
arguments that are presented in a cultural defence. There are concerns relating to 
generalisations and stereotyping of cultural groups, rendering cultural differences more 
absolute than they in reality are. Furthermore, there are issues relating to power that raises 
questions as to who is actually being protected by the cultural defence and whether we are at 
risk of protecting one fraction of a cultural group at the expense of another fraction of that 
same group. These issues will be discussed further in chapter 5, where they are analysed and 
discussed in relation to particular cases where the cultural defence has been invoked.  
 
4. Empirical Cases: Introducing Nadia and Kou 
This chapter will present two cases where culture has been used as evidence in court 
and where an assessment of cultural evidence was included in the verdict. The first case will 
be referred to as the “Nadia Case” and the information on the case that is presented here 
comes from Unni Wikan’s book from 2002 Generous Betrayal. The second case will be 
referred to as the “Kou Case” and is collected from Renteln’s The Cultural Defence (2004) 
and an article she contributed to The Human Rights of Persons with Intellectual Disabilities 
(2003). The Nadia Case was available to me in much more detail than any of the other cases 
that I read, the Kou Case included. Wikan herself was present at the entire trial in the Nadia 
Case whereas Renteln’s examples are all her own retellings of cases that she has read rather 
than attended and much less participated in. This was in fact the case in nearly all texts I read 
about the cultural defence.  
As mentioned in chapter 1.2, I have not chosen these cases with intent to represent the 
scope of the cultural defence; no two cases, let alone a single case, can account for the variety 
of situations where the cultural defences can be invoked or demonstrate the cultural defence. I 
have chosen cases that highlight many of the aspects of the debate presented until now in the 
thesis; for example both cases illustrate the necessity for a cultural defence to be able to 
account for cultural change as part of cultural reality. I will first present the facts from the two 
cases separately, not including the authors’ analysis and interpretation of data. I will then 
discuss how the concept of culture was presented and dealt with in each case.   
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4.1 The Nadia Case 
Nadia was born in Norway and was by birth right a Norwegian citizen. Both her parents were 
born in Morocco, moved to Norway in the 70s and acquired Norwegian citizenship in the 
mid-1980s (Wikan 2002, p. 173). In her teenage years Nadia suffered from beatings and 
abuse from her father, on account of having become (in her parents’ eyes) “too Norwegian”, 
and at seventeen she was taken by child services to a youth institution where she would live 
until she was eighteen and returned to her parents under the circumstances that her father 
promised not to beat her (ibid., p. 182). In September 1997, when Nadia was 18, her parents 
kidnapped her with help from other close relatives, among them her brother – drugged, 
handcuffed and transported in a van from Oslo to Morocco. A month later, October 1998, the 
place where Nadia worked prior to her disappearance received a phone call from Nadia who 
reported that she had been kidnapped by her parents and was being kept against her will in 
Morocco (her parents had confiscated her passport) and that there were plans to have her 
married against her will (ibid., p. 173). Getting Nadia back to Norway proved difficult 
because the Moroccan government could do nothing to intervene in the situation; Morocco 
acknowledges what Wikan describes as “ethnic citizenship” which means that a person cannot 
relinquish his or her citizenship if s/he moves to a different state (Nadia fell under this 
jurisdiction due to her Moroccan descent), and despite the fact that a crime had been 
committed against Nadia on Norwegian soil, she was still a minor by Moroccan law and 
therefore completely under her father’s authority (ibid, p. 174). Norwegian authorities had to 
resort to alternative measures to force the parents to send back Nadia; measures such as taking 
Nadia’s brother in for interrogation and keeping him in custody for being an accomplice in 
the kidnapping of his sister and suspending, by the book, all welfare subsidies that the family 
was receiving from Norway (ibid, p. 175). They in the end succeeded and Nadia returned to 
Norway. The Norwegian state brought Nadia’s parents to court for the kidnapping of Nadia 
(ibid., p. 177). 
 Wikan was an expert witness in the case. Witnesses for the defence included Nadia’s 
grandfather, Nadia’s brother, a social worker, two Norwegian-Moroccan girls and a leader 
from the Moroccan community. Witnesses for the prosecution included Nadia, the 
ambassador (who was the main communicator between Norwegian authorities and Nadia’s 
family while she was being held captive) and a psychologist whom Nadia had been seeing for 
a year (ibid.).  
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 Nadia’s parents, argued that Nadia had gone by free will to Morocco to visit her sick 
grandmother and that she was telling lies to the police and the court because she had been 
under influence of bad Norwegian friends. The lies also came from, according to her father, 
Nadia knowing that her honour was destroyed due to her not being a virgin anymore (ibid., 
181). They believed that Nadia had to be saved from the Norwegian influence and that it had 
been in their right to keep Nadia in Morocco because they believed that they had been under 
Moroccan authority. They argued that they were acting as any parent trying to protect their 
children would (ibid., p. 178-179).  
 Nadia’s testimony told another story, one of kidnapping and abuse. She also claimed 
that her parents believed her to be possessed by jinns and that she had been exposed to several 
cleansing rituals (ibid., p. 178). Nadia said that her mother had shown her a picture of a boy in 
Morocco to whom she would be married and subsequently “become Moroccan” (ibid., p. 
182). The ambassador who had been in contact with Nadia’s parents while she was kept 
hostage offered the same story as Nadia (ibid., p. 184). 
 The jury decided that both parents were guilty; her father was given a suspended 
sentence of one year and three months and her mother one year. The legal minimum for the 
crime for which they were convicted (“frihetsberøvelse”, or “having forcibly held someone 
against her will” (ibid., p. 177) is higher than the sentence that each parent received (ibid., p. 
187).  
Now I will present a few excerpts from the jury’s written verdict: 
“The defence attorneys have argued for acquittal on the grounds that Nadia, 
according to Moroccan law, becomes legally adult only at twenty years of age 
[…] The court does not agree.”  
“Ignorance of the law […] is likewise not applicable.”  
“…applying for Norwegian citizenship […] implies both rights and duties”  
“The case arises from culture conflicts. But it is the parents who have chosen 
to live in Norway. […] maintain customs of their country of birth is 
unobjectionable as long as these customs do not come into conflict with 
Norwegian law.” 
“The parents have made a choice as to which country their children will be 
moulded by.”  
(ibid., p. 190-191) 
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4.1.2 Culture in the Nadia Case 
Now I wish to trace the concept of culture and the part it played in the Nadia case – how it 
was integrated in the defence’s plea for acquittal, how it compelled the choice of witnesses for 
both sides and how culture was presented in the actual sentencing of Nadia’s parents.  
 It is at first glance not obvious that the Nadia case is illustrative for understanding the 
use of culture as a defence in court. The main plea of the defendants was not that they had 
(Moroccan) “cultural motives” (see Renteln in Ch. 2.1) for keeping Nadia in Morocco against 
her will nor that they committed the act because of their cultural background (see Woodman 
in Ch. 2.2). In fact, in Wikan’s analysis of this case the defendants chose to omit cultural 
evidence where it could have been presented – recall Nadia’s claim that her parents believed 
that she was possessed by jinns and that they put her through several cleansing rituals, some 
of which were appeared shocking to most Norwegian minds (and quite possibly by Moroccan 
standards, one should add) (Wikan 2002, p. 178). Theoretically, the parents could have used 
this information as “cultural evidence”, attempting to prove that their culturally held beliefs 
motivated them to keep Nadia in Morocco so that she could undergo treatment of what they 
believed to be a real threat to their daughter’s well-being. What Nadia’s parents did, on the 
other hand, was to reject the allegations altogether. According to Wikan, this was in order to 
present themselves as reasonable people by modern standards as opposed to cultural 
“primitive” standards and appealing to a universal parental need to protect their child who is 
in trouble (Wikan 2002, p.179).  
 So why is this case worthy of our attention if we wish to discuss the culture as a 
concept available as a defence? Because the verdict by discussing culture at length, and even 
though it was decided that culture was not valid as grounds for acquittal in this case, shows 
that culture was indeed appealed to by the defence. Despite the parents’ appeal to a universal 
parental need to protect their children as the motivating factor for detaining their daughter in 
Morocco, both the peril that they perceived Nadia to be in and their method of responding to 
their parental need to protect Nadia were in the name of culture, or “culturally motivated”. 
The “problem” with Nadia was that she was becoming “too Norwegian” and the parents 
argued time and again that Nadia was not really at fault but that she had been misled by her 
Norwegian friends (Wikan 2002, p.178). So, conceptions of culture were at the root of this 
case from the beginning or, as the verdict states: “the case arises from culture conflicts” 
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(Wikan 2002, p. 191). Furthermore, their method for dealing with the problem of Nadia was 
also legitimised within a cultural framework when they claimed ignorance of the law – they 
were within the Moroccan legal boundaries when they detained their daughter who was still a 
minor (in Morocco). This act was conceived of as being in Nadia’s own interest and they 
argued that they did not know that they were breaching Norwegian laws. As we see then, this 
defence plea has its roots in “cultural misunderstandings” and generally a large portion of the 
defence was articulated in terms of culture.  
 Culture was evident other places in the trial as well and now we come to the practical 
aspect of calling a cultural defence. The witnesses for each side were clearly divided into a 
“Norwegian side” and a “Moroccan side”. The defence had, as we remember, a couple of 
Nadia’s Moroccan friends, Nadia’s grandfather and a Moroccan community leader. Wikan 
was also originally called in as a witness for the defence, but had on her own request changed 
her status to expert witness (Wikan 2002, p. 186). The Norwegian state had, other than Nadia 
herself, the ambassador and a psychologist. So it would seem as though the very structure of 
the trial was constructed along cultural lines; Morocco versus Norway, minority versus 
majority. The public reactions (the Nadia case was a highly publicised case in Norway) to the 
verdict seem to indicate this as well; some accused the Norwegian state of using the Nadia 
case as an opportunity to oppose Muslims in general and devalue their religion and culture 
(Wikan 2002, p. 192). Yet others argued that this was a step taken in the right direction and 
that Norway needed to be clear about just how much “culture” they were ready to tolerate 
(ibid.). Regardless of which of these positions one aligns oneself with, it is clear from the 
public discourse in the media following the case that it was presented as a culture conflict, 
one between Norwegian majority culture and Muslim minority culture and that the latter had 
had to give way to the former; the court had established that the cultural justifications for 
behaviour would not hold up in court.  
 Wikan is among those who applaud the Norwegian court for disregarding culture as a 
defence in this case because it meant looking past the cultural straightjacket that she argues 
many Norwegian second generation immigrants are born into and seeing instead an 
autonomous person who has had her rights infringed upon (Wikan 2002, p. 214). Renteln 
would agree that cultural defence was dismissed in this case, yet not share Wikan’s 
congratulatory attitude to this outcome. The following quote from Renteln has already been 
referred to, but suggests that she would have considered the cultural defence as valid in the 
Nadia case: “[…] an individual’s behaviour is influenced to such a large extent by his culture 
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that either (1) the individual simply did not believe that his actions contravened any laws, or 
(2) the individual felt compelled to act the way he did. In both cases the individual’s 
culpability is lessened.” (Renteln 2004, p. 187) If these were criteria against which we should 
evaluate a cultural defence then indeed the verdict in the Nadia case would have sounded very 
different. Yet, there is reason to believe that even though culture was not accepted as a 
defence in the written verdict, it did play a part in the sentence that each parent received, 
which was, as we remember, below the legal minimum for the crime they were on trial for. 
Renteln has, in the articles and book that I have read by her, accounted for numerous cases 
where this has happened – that the judge rejects the cultural defence, but still gives a 
relatively mild punishment (Renteln 2004; Renteln 2009a; Renteln 2009b).  
 Ultimately, I do not agree that culture was ignored or devalued in this case. If one 
bases one’s argument on the presumption that culture equals tradition and heritage and assign 
culture to “the other” as a measurement of difference, then one might very well say that 
culture lost and that the jury undermined the cultural arguments and explanations that were 
provided. But if we instead assume that culture is a dynamic on-going process (Wikan 2002, 
p. 77) that pertains to majority as well as minority and that is equally represented by children, 
women and men, (ibid, p.78) then we see that culture was very central to the verdict, but not 
treated as an artefact that had been passed down to Nadia through her parents. It was showed 
that Nadia’s lived reality, including her culture, was equally valid to that of her parents. It is 
only because of the pervasiveness of the dominant discourse of culture, which anthropologists 
have helped establish and maintain well to note, that the public media picked up this case as a 
dramatic example of a culture clash.   
 
4.2 The Kou Case 
The Kou case took place in California during the early 90s. Kou Xiong was born to Hmong 
parents whose country of origin is unclear from Renteln’s accounts of the case. It is clear that 
some if not all of the Xiong’s children were born abroad and that they for a while resided in a 
Thai refugee camp (Renteln 2004, p. 62). Kou was born with a congenital deformity called 
club foot and a dislocated right hip and when Kou was 6 a paediatrician made an evaluation 
that Kou would become wheelchair bound at an early age if he did not undergo surgery to 
correct his condition. When Kou’s parents refused to let him have the surgery the doctor 
contacted child services who sought temporary custody of Kou on the grounds that the parents 
 27 
had failed to correct Kou’s congenital condition. With temporary custody they would be able 
to consent to the surgery on Kou’s behalf (Renteln 2003, p. 67). The case went to court and 
Kou’s parents fought for their right to decide against surgery for Kou based on their cultural 
and religious beliefs. Kou’s parents believed that Kou had been born with his defects for a 
reason; to redeem the sins of his ancestors. If Kou underwent the surgery then Kou and those 
around him would at some time be subject to “divine retribution” (ibid., p. 68). Kou’s parents 
also feared that he would be ostracised as a consequence of the surgery and would spend the 
rest of his life as a social outcast (Renteln 2004, p. 62) As Kou’s condition was not life-
threatening and the surgery was not risk free nor guaranteed to succeed, and would have to be 
undertaken more than once, the parents argued that their cultural and religious beliefs should 
be respected (ibid.).  
That Kou was between six and eight from the doctor first sought custody to the trial 
ended after a number of appeals made it difficult to base the verdict on the child’s own 
wishes, especially since Kou himself said both that “he did not want surgery and that he did 
not want to be in a wheelchair” (ibid.). Kou’s parents had, on the other hand, support from 
representatives of Hmong community. They agreed with Kou’s parents’ beliefs that Kou was 
atoning for his ancestors’ sins and that horror might befall the family if Kou’s parents tried to 
have his condition fixed. A total of twenty
4
 leaders from various Hmong communities signed 
a petition to try to convince the Director of the child services department in question to 
change his mind on insisting on medical treatment (Renteln 2003, p. 68).  
Kou’s parents lost the case on all appeals all the way to the Supreme Court and the 
surgery was ordered to take place, but as of 1992 there was no doctor who was willing to 
perform the surgery without the parents’ cooperation (Renteln 2004, p. 62). Ultimately, the 
judge who had had the case the first time around decided to vacate his ruling after learning 
from a psychiatric report that the prospect of ostracism and the responsibility that he would 
feel should something happen to his siblings after surgery put Kou at “grave psychological 
risk” (ibid.).  
 
                                                        
4 In Renteln (2004) it is stated that there were eighteen clan leaders, not twenty, but as this no 
difference for my argument later I have chosen to ignore this discrepancy. 
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4.2.1 Culture in the Kou Case 
 Renteln uses the exact term to describe the Kou case as the jury did to describe the 
Nadia case: as a culture clash (Renteln 2003, p. 67). In this case, according to Renteln, the 
clash was brought about by “divergent interpretations of a particular disability” (ibid.). 
Renteln is worried by the fact that the verdicts from every appeal agreed that a child’s ability 
to walk was seen as such an important matter in our society that it could override parents’ 
culturally and religiously motivated wishes to not put their child through extensive surgery 
(ibid., p. 69). What I must point out is that the “divergent interpretations” that Renteln refers 
to are mainly about the cause of the disability, not about whether or not Kou will live the rest 
of his life with a disability. To be wheelchair bound might be, as far as any information 
presented by Renteln is concerned, considered as much a disability among the Hmong as it is 
in the US and imply a decrease in life quality and possibilities even in the eyes of the Hmong. 
The only way in which we know that the opinions of the Hmong and the US legal system 
truly diverged is that the Hmong community believed that he deserved his by birth given 
disability due to the sins of his ancestors and that US legal system would not speculate as to 
why Kou was dealt the unfortunate genetic cards of being born with a club foot and a 
dislocated right hip.  
 As mentioned, twenty leaders from different Hmong communities went together and 
signed a petition as a plea for the director of the child services department to retract the law 
suit. Renteln derives from this that there was a unified support in the Hmong community for 
Kou’s parents’ decision not to operate him (Renteln 2003, p. 68). However, in doing so 
Renteln conflates having support from leaders of the communities with having support from 
the entire community. The consensus that Renteln argues existed in the community is actually 
derived from only twenty Hmong people, albeit their high position in the community. Courts 
must be careful when considering evidence that is supposed to show a prevalence or a 
uniform position taken by a community so as to not make judgements based on 
generalisations such as the one made by Renteln here. 
It is clear from the verdicts that the cultural arguments in themselves, as sincerely held 
as these beliefs might have been, were not enough to convince the jury against surgery. What 
in the end was enough to convince one judge to relinquish his decision was the prospect of the 
child becoming a social outcast because of the operation putting him – despite the physical 
improvement – at “grave psychological risk”.   
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5. Some Final Questions Regarding the Cultural Defence 
In this last chapter of the thesis my aim is to further discuss and problematise the prospect of 
using the concept of culture as a defence plea in a court of law. I will do so by raising four 
questions surrounding the cultural defence that I believe deserve particular attention. These 
questions are presented as subchapters that should reflect some of the most pressing matters 
concerning the cultural defence – who is allowed to speak for culture in a courtroom? Whose 
rights are being protected? What kind of cultural expertise is available and what are some of 
the issues pertaining to these? Can the cultural defence exist in a form that adjusts to the 
changing nature of culture over time?  
 
5.1 How Is Cultural Evidence Provided in a Cultural Defence? 
Witnessing on Behalf of Culture 
Witnessing on behalf of culture raises necessary questions about the person giving the 
testimony and his or her own cultural affiliation, about representation and authority, and about 
the nature of what is being defended; namely culture. The problem is practical in that for a 
cultural defence to at all be possible the defendant must be able to provide material or 
statements that somehow verify the cultural arguments. Calling in an expert witness can give 
strength to a cultural defence and as mentioned in chapter 3.7, these witnesses can be 
representatives from the cultural community that the defendant belongs to or they can be 
outsiders with particular knowledge about the culture in question. Seeing as both types of 
witnesses are often accepted in court the cultural information they can relay must be 
considered pertinent to cases where culture is part of the defence. Why is this? What cultural 
knowledge is available to people in these positions and how do they present this knowledge in 
a courtroom? These questions can be answered differently by looking to different theories 
concerning culture, authority and representation. I will first discuss the legitimacy of the 
different types of expert witnesses from the various perspectives on culture, authority and 
representation that have been dealt with so far in the paper. Then I will investigate the topic 
further with help from the empirical data from the Nadia case and the Kou case.  
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 Renteln bases her analyses on the concept of enculturation (Renteln 2004, p. 12). She 
relies on anthropologist Ralph Linton’s explanation of enculturation: “no matter what the 
method by which the individual receives the elements of culture characteristics of his society, 
he is sure to internalize most of them” (Linton in Renteln 2004, p. 12). If we employ this 
understanding of how individuals acquire culture it follows that a native expert witness is 
indeed in possession of highly precise knowledge of the cultural motivations that the 
defendant claims were decisive in committing the crime. This is because the native expert 
witness, as he or she is part of the same culture as the defendant, will have internalised most 
of the same culture. This understanding of the individual and culture does not, of course, 
remove the risk that the native expert witness has interests relating to the case that in turn 
significantly shape the testimony, but it renders the native expert witness a very reliable 
source insofar as he or she possesses knowledge that is consistent with the culture of the 
defendant due to the process of “enculturation”.  
The idea that individuals internalise most of the values and knowledge that constitute 
“their culture” has been, and is still, assumed by many anthropologists and has in part 
legitimised the use of “key informants” as a source of information about a culture. Barth’s 
theory on culture which we encountered in chapter 2.3 dismisses this assumption entirely. 
There are no key informants because no culture can be seen a template of knowledge, norms 
and values that is sketched into each individual’s mind and available for them to act upon 
(Barth 1989, p. 139), as is suggested by the theory of enculturation. Culture is distributive, 
according to Barth (ibid., p. 134). Every person has what he calls a limited horizon: “…people 
– each of us – live our lives with a consciousness and a horizon that encompasses much less 
than the sum of the society, institutions and forces that impinges on us” (ibid., p. 140). If we 
accept this relationship between individual and culture then the use of a native expert witness 
becomes even further problematised in that the knowledge he or she possesses in itself has 
much less explanatory value than first assumed. Following Barth’s theory, if the native expert 
witness is to the jury in a court of law what the key informant is to the anthropologist in the 
field, then the native expert witness should be redundant because one does not, according to 
Barth, become an “expert” on one’s own culture simply by living in it.  
 Expert witnesses in cases of cultural defence will often be anthropologists for the 
obvious reason that anthropologists traditionally have had “culture” as their unit of analysis. 
Just as with the native expert witnesses, the role of anthropologists and the nature of the 
knowledge that they collect can be discussed from different vantage points. Even though 
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Caughey argues, as was seen in Ch. 3.7, that the anthropologist’s academic training helps 
them with presenting cultural knowledge in a scientific and professional manner it is not 
obvious that an anthropologist, or any other professional, will necessarily be more objective 
or devoid of personal interests in relation to a case than would a native expert witness. 
Anthropologists align themselves with different approaches to anthropology as a subject, 
subscribe to different theoretical schools, and might have their own agendas with their 
anthropological work. All this will shape what information is presented in court and how it is 
transmitted. For example, Caughey described the importance of not reducing the defendant to 
a cultural clone and how he underscored the importance of positioning – to investigate the 
defendant’s personal cultural background (Caughey 2009, p. 327). Thus he would collect and 
present knowledge in a manner that is consistent with person-centred ethnography. There is 
by no means unitary agreement amongst anthropologists about the supremacy of person-
centred ethnography or the value of life histories, and it is very likely that anthropologists, 
when asked to “bring up any matter that [they judge] to be of significance to the case” (Wikan 
2002, p. 188) will answer very differently depending on what type of anthropology they 
subscribe to.  
 In the Nadia case, both a Moroccan community leader and Unni Wikan were initially 
called in as witnesses for the defence (but Wikan changed her status from witness for the 
defence to amicus curie and expert witness, as we remember). If it was not for the fact that 
Wikan had originally been called in by the defence party, she would perhaps have been a 
controversial choice for an expert witness. She has been prominently featured in several 
Norwegian newspapers defending the plight of young immigrants, especially Muslims, to lead 
a life free from culturally imposed constraints and arguing against the use of culture as a 
defence against anti-liberal and oppressive practices (Wikan 2002, p. 13). The expert witness 
in the Nadia case was hardly neutral towards the type of cultural conflict that the trial was 
seen as a result of. Indeed, Wikan herself says that she was, exactly for these reasons, 
surprised when Nadia’s parents and their lawyers contacted her (ibid., p. 186). Wikan’s 
testimony (which is retold by Wikan herself, for better or worse) described how Nadia would, 
in the eyes of many in the Moroccan community, be guilty of a heinous crime, namely that of 
putting one’s mother in jail. She described the social ramifications for Nadia should her 
parents be thrown in jail (total ostracism from her family and the Moroccan community) and 
the “law of obedience” that Nadia’s mother was subject to as a Muslim wife (ibid., p. 188). 
According to Wikan, her testimony probably helped reduce the sentence to below minimum 
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level so as to keep the options for family reunification open (ibid., p. 187). As I argued above 
the testimony of an anthropologist expert witness will inescapably resonate with that 
particular anthropologist’s academic and non-academic convictions and beliefs, and Wikan 
must be no exception. I cannot, of course, know what another anthropologist would say in the 
witness box, but Wikan’s view on male-female relationships and patriarchy in many Muslim 
communities is not shared by everyone. Wikan argument is that family structures among 
immigrants from the MENA-region often are patriarchal, which means that all power rests 
with a male head and daughters rank the lowest in the hierarchy (ibid., p. 99). Ballard 
criticises this type of conception of “patriarchy” that is often ascribed to Muslim communities 
and that places power with the men and constitute women as powerless victims (Ballard 2009, 
p. 314). He argues that many ignore the “emotional power that women exercise over their 
husbands and […] their offspring” and that “mothers frequently operate as the real power 
behind the patriarchal throne no matter how much they may be content to allow public 
appearances to suggest the reverse” (ibid.). It is highly unlikely that someone with this view 
on patriarchy and the woman’s position within it would argue explicitly for a mother being 
less culpable due to being subject to a “law of obedience”, such as Wikan argued. We also 
know that Nadia’s mother did receive a milder sentence than Nadia’s father, so it is worth 
taking these differences in opinion seriously as they can have very real effects for people 
involved in a trial with a cultural defence.   
 
5.2 Is the Cultural Defence Compatible with Cultural Change? 
The question now turns to how the cultural defence can be applicable over time. I have 
already, in chapter 3.5, asked whether a cultural defence would be able to adapt to the 
changing character of culture over time or whether it would become a reactionary measure in 
that it confines minorities to a time and a place and impedes development. In this subchapter I 
will further discuss this matter with reference to the case studies and highlight that we need to 
get past the essentialist understanding of culture and its synchronic character if we are to use 
the cultural defence in a diachronic, changing reality.  
 Where this issue becomes the most salient is in cases concerning children. A child’s 
culture will be constructed as a response to several sources, of which the parents are only one 
among many, and it is with this in mind that Wikan claims that every child has a right to be 
considered a non-immigrant in their country of birth (Wikan 2002, p. 36). To Wikan’s mind 
 33 
this frees the child from having to represent a culture and heritage that they might not identify 
with. However, to the same extent that a child has a right to differ from his or her “cultural 
heritage”, he or she will have an equally strong right to differ from the majority culture 
(Ballard 2009, p. 302) and have their cultural background respected as a valid constituent of 
their identity. Is it possible for legislation and law, and in particular the cultural defence, to 
accommodate both?  
 Both the Kou case and the Nadia case are illustrative here. Nadia was not a child, as 
she was over 18, but a concern in the case was how much Nadia’s parents had the right to 
protect Nadia against Norwegian cultural influence and compel Moroccan culture to take its 
place. As the case turned out, the jury decided to value Nadia’s right to create her own 
identity independent of her parents’ cultural belonging: “children can develop in ways that are 
different from what the parents hope for […] The parents have made a choice as to which 
country their children will be moulded by” (excerpt from the verdict in Wikan 2002, p. 191). 
During the trial, however, the defence tried to present Nadia as a child whose behaviour had 
caused great stress and anxiety for the parents. To support this position we remember that 
they called in a Moroccan community leader to testify in favour of their position: that Nadia’s 
behaviour was by Moroccan standards highly inappropriate and that the parents’ response was 
understandable from a Moroccan vantage point. Beyond the criticisms that can be raised 
against native expert witnesses that were dealt with in the previous chapter, the Nadia case 
brings in yet another dimension: that of representing generations. A native witness will often 
be a prominent figure in the community in question and will consequently be a mature adult if 
not an elder. When a native expert witness is used in a trial involving children or young adults 
there is an implicit assumption that the witness has authoritative knowledge of the appropriate 
conduct in the culture that he or she is representing. Wikan argues that this view of culture as 
transmitted through generations is particularly imbued in the majority’s understanding of 
other cultures than their own (Wikan 2002, p. 26). If we turn the scenario around and ask 
ourselves who we would give authority to define the culturally accepted parameters of our 
conduct, the answer would probably not be a person from our parents’ or even grandparents’ 
generation or a religious leader. Yet this is what the Moroccan community leader was allowed 
to do for Nadia, albeit that his testimony did not affect the verdict to Nadia’s disadvantage in 
the end.  
 As mentioned, Nadia was 18 and thus legally an adult in Norway and this was 
according to Wikan decisive for the verdict (Wikan 2002, p. 211). Persons who are children in 
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the legal sense are under their parents’ jurisdiction and they have a right to raise their children 
in any way they see fit that does not conflict with the law. Parents make choices on behalf of 
their children in all societies and in all cultures and it is always a sensitive issue to define how 
much states should be able to intervene in family matters. Schiratzki asks a pertinent question 
in the introduction of her book on children’s best interests in a multicultural Sweden: to what 
extent should a child’s heritage be considered in deciding what is in the child’s best interest? 
(Schiratzki 2005, p. 8).  In the Kou case the parents made a decision on Kou’s behalf which 
did not resonate with the medical or juridical conception of what was in the child’s best 
interests. What complicates this case in relation to the Nadia case is that Kou was only six 
years old when the case began and therefore not considered to be able to fully comprehend the 
consequences of the decisions that were being made for him. Kou stated that he did not want 
to become wheelchair bound any more than he wanted to be a social outcast in his 
community. What was said in Nadia’s verdict about it being impossible to know how a child’s 
cultural afflictions turn out, especially if the child is raised in another cultural context than the 
parents, is true indeed. Kou might grow up to share his parents’ convictions that he is atoning 
for his ancestors’ sins and that his being in a wheelchair prevents misfortune to befall his 
closest family, which means that he will carry his disability for the sake of the wellbeing of 
his family and this he might be content with. On the other hand, he might grow up to believe 
that this is nothing more than superstition and that his parents’ unfounded beliefs put him in a 
wheelchair when he did not have to be, and possibly even blame the system that made this 
decision for him.  
 With the cultural defence in this case, Kou’s parents argued that their culturally held 
beliefs concerning their son’s condition ought to have primacy over Western doctors’ 
evaluation of the boy’s best medical interests. The sword is double-edged in that culture could 
potentially be used as a tool for sentencing a six year old boy to a life in a wheelchair, yet 
there is no arguing that what constitutes a disability is culturally negotiable, as is indeed the 
very idea that where prevention of disability is possible it should always be sought. Ballard 
states that there is a tendency in Western society since the Enlightenment to promote progress 
from an unenlightened past and “towards a rosier, but necessarily singular, future” (Ballard 
2009, p. 302). Kou’s parents conscious decision to not have Kou function at full physical 
capacity is then at clear variance with the vision that Ballard describes and a clear expression 
of a legacy from “the unenlightened past”. Yet, it is in Western society that Kou will grow up. 
It is important to keep in mind that where children are involved, it is never simply a conflict 
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between two cultures, between a minority culture and the dominant culture that dictates the 
legal system. The child is probably not best represented by any of these cultures alone. Kou’s 
wish shows both that he wished to be a part of the Hmong community and live in harmony 
with his parents and that he disliked the prospect of being wheelchair bound. To construct this 
option as impossible is to my mind to render the two cultures as having differences more 
irreconcilable than might in fact be the case. This could even be a fault line incorporated into 
the cultural defence as such; that it invariably emphasises the differences between the 
minority culture and the majority culture and sets the two up against each other. It would be 
premature to decide that just because the cultural defence is invoked, the differences at hand 
are irreconcilable and the trial must lead to a decision in favour of one “culture” or the other. 
It is not strange that Kou, along with other children who are caught up in what we call 
“culture conflicts”, should want to live a full life in terms of physical and mental health and a 
sense of freedom of choice, but be weary to do so at the expense of their family and 
community. It is sadly the case that when the cultural defence is invoked there seems to 
suddenly be a focus on “our way” or “their way”, when in reality “both ways” needs not be an 
unviable wish. Let me motivate this statement with a couple of examples.  
As I see it, neither of Kou’s requests are unreasonable nor mutually exclusive. Kou 
should not be put in a position where he has to “choose sides” if it can be helped. Nor should 
court have to choose sides for him. There are viable options that include mediation between 
the two parties. Renteln describes a case similar to the Kou case, where the parents of an 
infant child refused to operate on the child who had cancer in both eyes on grounds founded 
in their Hmong cultural background (Renteln 2004, p. 63). This child’s life was at risk so the 
state’s case was stronger than in the Kou case and the parents ran away with the child in order 
to escape the authorities. Instead of removing the child from its parents and incarcerating the 
parents for abduction, a Hmong representative was willing to cooperate with the authorities 
and functioned as a mediating instance, urging the parents to accept the surgery, which they 
eventually did (ibid, p. 64). Through mediation it should be possible to avoid situations where 
children are subjects of court cases between their parents, who as a rule in all cultures intend 
no harm and love their children, and the state. Wikan has herself been asked to mediate in 
conflicts where culture has been considered to be central to the dispute (Wikan 2002, p. 148-
155). For instance, a Muslim leader asked if Wikan could talk to a family who were in a 
dispute with the administration at their daughter’s school because she was required to take 
swimming lessons and the parents would not let her. As the Muslim leader saw it, he could 
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not talk to the girl’s family because it could compromise his authority as a devout Muslim, 
but wanted the family to not let the dispute go any further and allow their daughter to take the 
swimming classes (ibid., p. 148).   
 In cases where the cultural defence has been invoked and where children are involved 
it becomes clear that the cultural defence needs to be a legal tool that is constantly revised and 
developed so as to best be able represent cultural minorities in court in a manner that is not 
oversimplified, generalising nor outdated. We are confronted with the fact that culture does 
change over time, from generation to generation, and the cultural defence needs to operate 
with a concept of culture that accounts for this. An essentialist understanding of culture, 
where people are believed to incorporate most of the cultural knowledge available to them 
and act according to it, does not reflect the changing reality of people’s lived experience.  
 
5.3 Protection of the Weakest? Revisiting Culture and Authority 
One of the functions of the law is to protect the members of society and in particular the 
weakest members should be protected (Schiratzki 2008, p. 18). Renteln and Ballard, both 
arguing in favour of culture having greater bearing in court, argue that minority cultures are 
collectively weaker in relation to the majority culture, whose values and norms the system of 
law is founded upon and that this should require the legal system to incorporate tools that 
support minority cultures (Renteln 2009b, p. 61, Ballard 2009, p. 25). The problem here is the 
assumption that one culture equals one voice and one identity (Wikan 2002, p. 63). It has 
been argued in this thesis that this notion of culture, which falls under the essentialist 
approach, is inadequate for using in a cultural defence. This is partly because of the problem 
of authority, i.e. who gets to speak for whom (Ardener, see Ch. 3.6 in this paper). Baumann 
states that the dividing lines between cultures are established by the elites (Baumann 1999, p. 
87), and thus supports those who argue that the people of a culture have unequal opportunities 
to define their culture, as was argued by Ardener and discussed in chapter 3.6. This does not 
mean that culture in itself is necessarily a power tool, nor that power only goes in one 
direction and is vested to certain degrees in certain people. In my opinion, the most helpful 
way to understand culture and authority is to view culture and cultural behaviour as always 
imbued with intentions and interests (Barth 1989, p. 124, 134). I believe that in order for a 
concept of culture to be adequate and defendable in a court of law it needs to contain an 
understanding of this dynamic; the issue of authority within a culture is as important as that 
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between culture if we are to operate with culture as a defence in court. A concept of culture 
that does not involve this aspect will not be sufficient to use in a cultural defence as it will not 
be able to protect the weakest members of society.  
 If we return to the Kou case, it was made clear in the parents’ defence that Kou was at 
risk of being ostracised if he underwent the surgery, and it is expressed that he was concerned 
about being excluded both from the community at large and from his family (Renteln 2004, p. 
63). It is quite possible, however, that the prospect of being ostracised was as real for Kou’s 
parents if they let Kou have the surgery as it was for Kou. Seeing as Kou was six years old it 
is hard to imagine a scenario where a community was able to exclude only Kou and not his 
family. This is not to say that being socially excluded would be any easier on Kou if his entire 
family was excluded because of something that was done to him; it is only to suggest that 
there were more interests than only Kou’s at stake if Kou would have to undergo the surgery 
even though the defence made it seem that it all was largely in Kou’s own interest.  
 
5.4 Is Culture too Elusive to Take to Court? 
Up until now there has been a very critical view on the cultural defence and its possible 
ramifications. There has been particular emphasis on how we view culture as central to the 
defences’ legitimacy. Wikan, who is very sceptical towards using culture as a defence, argues 
that the concept of culture that we encounter in public discourse and which is often used as a 
basis to legitimise criminal behaviour is based on an “outmoded model of culture that [is] 
being discarded by anthropologists” (Wikan 2002, p. 77). That anthropologists have replaced 
essentialist understandings of culture with more processual, discursive and dynamic 
approaches to understand and analyse culture is true. This does not mean that we can ignore 
culture, though, regardless of how elusively constructed we might believe it to be. For as 
Baumann suggests, one cannot simply disregard the dominant discourse on culture, the one 
that resonates with essentialism, because we believe it to be an erroneous belief about human 
relations (Baumann 1999, p. 90). The dominant discourse on culture constitutes people’s 
conceptual reality as much as the demotic does and this in itself is reason to take the matter 
seriously. The pervasiveness of the dominant discourse on culture should be understood and 
taken into account when deliberating about the cultural defence. It is the dominant discourse 
on culture that Amirthalingam is afraid will fuel stereotyping and generalisations to a cultural 
defence should one be adopted (Amirthalingam 2009, p. 43). For instance, there is the 
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controversial use of the “ordinary reasonable person” as a standard against which the 
defendant is evaluated. This legal tool is clearly more accessible and beneficial to people who 
fall closer to what the court decides is an “ordinary person” – a definition which will 
inevitably be derived from a conceptual framework that is more prevalent among citizens who 
belong to the majority culture. As long as legal tools such as this are operating it is clear that 
minorities are in some regards discriminated against and culture as an alternative form of 
defence is a topic worthy of consideration. Lastly, culture cannot be entirely dismissed 
because culture can never be completely removed; as the quote by Caughey that introduces 
this thesis suggests; the very structure of our juridical system is cultural (Caughey 2009, p. 
323). The fact that culture does not pertain only to “the other” needs to be treated with more 
sensitivity lest we risk to reduce minorities to an “inferior standard that has to be 
accommodated by the grace of the majority” (Amirthalingam 2009, p. 34).  
 The abstract and dynamic nature of culture should not alone lead us to discard the 
prospect of a cultural defence. What we have seen in this paper is that the cultural defence 
needs to operate with a concept of culture that can account for cultural change, agency and the 
distributive nature of culture (as discussed by Barth 1989). If it is possible to develop a 
cultural defence that rests on these assumptions, then I believe that the discussion concerning 
whether or not to establish the cultural defence as a rule of state law would benefit hugely 
(see Woodman Ch. 2.1 in this thesis). In this thesis there has been mention of scholars who 
have attempted to approach the problem this way – avoiding to throw the legal baby out with 
the cultural cradle, so to speak. Caughey, for instance, argued for using anthropologists as 
expert witnesses in a cultural defence but emphasised the importance of the anthropologist to 
consider the individual cultural background of the defendant. Amirthalingam in turn argued 
that a more inclusive criminal law should allow for cultural differences to be considered, but 
that focus should be on subjective experiences and not archetypes and hence avoid rendering 
cultural differences as absolute, which will only fuel already existing cultural stereotypes.   
 
6. Conclusion 
This thesis has investigated the use of culture as a legal defence in a court of law. Cultural 
diversity has increasingly become a challenge facing legal practice and jurisprudence. We 
saw, with the help from methodological nationalism, how our system of law is developed 
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around an idea of “one people, one nation” – an idea whose reflection of reality is becoming 
less and less evident. The cultural defence is one response to the challenges concerning 
cultural diversity and jurisprudence. Surrounding the cultural defence there are discussions 
going about the extent of a cultural defence (for instance whether it should be a complete or 
partial defence), about the effects that a cultural defence could have for minority groups, the 
principle of equality and how cultural evidence could be presented and hold bearing in a 
courtroom. Absent in many articles and books on the cultural defence, multicultural 
jurisprudence and law and cultural diversity was a comprehensive discussion and clarification 
on what is meant by culture. To my mind this should be an obvious starting point for a 
discussion on a cultural defence because the fact of the matter is that only when we are on the 
clear about what we are talking (or arguing) about can we start developing the means through 
which to accommodate it.  
 Renteln, who was the staunchest defender of the cultural defence, used an essentialist 
understanding of culture, leaning on the concept of “enculturation”. Other scholars, who were 
more ambivalent, though not wholly negative, to the idea of using culture as a defence, often 
voiced concerns about generalisation and stereotyping, the problem of authority and 
representation and making minorities less morally capable than the majority population. It 
seemed to me that many of the problems concerning the cultural defence were rooted in how 
we perceived of culture to begin with. As we saw in chapter 5, many of the issues are an 
effect of operating with an essentialist model of culture in the courtroom, partly because of 
this model’s propensity to grossly underestimate the capacity for agency among people, to 
overestimate consensus and its inability to account for change. I have presented alternative 
theories on culture, mainly with help from Barth, Wikan and Baumann, which directly 
challenge the essentialist understanding of culture. These theories were used to discuss the 
issues surrounding the cultural defence in a new light and in relation to two empirical 
examples, the Kou case and the Nadia case.  
 The title of this thesis alludes to the two aims that were phrased as research questions 
at the beginning of this paper: to provide a discussion on the main issues around the cultural 
defence, i.e. literally “taking culture to court”, and to scrutinize the viability of very concept 
of culture in a court of law, i.e. taking the concept of culture to (a metaphorical) court. The 
conclusion of this paper that is that the latter is a prerequisite for the former. We cannot 
develop a model of a cultural defence that is viable and provides justice to all individuals in 
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society before we settle on an understanding of culture that truly reflects its dynamic and 
distributive nature yet is practically feasible to operate with in a court of law.  
 
6.1 Suggestions for Further Research 
This topic deserves to be investigated within a broader framework so as to cover the scope of 
the cultural defence (including civil cases, indigenous rights etc., see Ch. 1.2). More attention 
should also be brought to, as was briefly mentioned in the last chapter, how minorities are 
disadvantaged within the current legal structure. Most importantly, though, and this goes for 
the two aforementioned suggestions as well as my own research in this thesis, I think that 
extensive empirical research on how culture plays out in court is needed if we are to really 
understand the use of a cultural defence with its advantages and disadvantages. Not all trials 
are open to the public so to some degree fieldwork will not always be a viable option, but to 
the extent that it is an option I think it is the best way to collect information (and rather have 
the written cases as supplements) on the cultural defence and what its ramifications are. 
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